Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Masters Theses

Student Theses & Publications

2019

Forecasting Recessions in the U.S.A.
Tran B. Ngoc
Eastern Illinois University, tbngoc@eiu.edu

Recommended Citation
Ngoc, Tran B., "Forecasting Recessions in the U.S.A." (2019). Masters Theses. 4530.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/4530

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

0

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.
Tran B. Ngoc
ECN 5950 – Spring 2019
Eastern Illinois University
Advised by Dr. Mukti Upadhyay

1

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Many economists have raised concerns about the next recession in the U.S., especially

after the Great Recession in 2008. Many believe that the next recession will strike either
this year (2019) or the next year (2020). This paper first analyzes different
macroeconomic indicators such as Buffet Indicators, interest rate, unemployment rate,
etc. In terms of modelling the data, a Probit model is applied to determine what variables
can affect the probability of a recession. Then, going beyond whether or not a recession
is likely at any time in future, a relevant question will be how long a time might elapse
before the next recession will set in. This can be answered by using a Poisson model.
Our results from the Probit model suggest that the government should focus on
improving unemployment rate rather than interest rates by having more open policies for
small businesses. In addition, the Poisson model forecasts that the next recession will
likely occur in 2020.
Keywords: recession, forecasting

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, not only my professor in many classes but
also my mentor, Dr. Mukti Upadhyay of the Department of Economics at Eastern Illinois
University. The door to Prof. Upadhyay’s office was always open and his responses were
always instantaneous through both email and messages whenever I ran into trouble or had
a question about my research or writing. He consistently allowed this paper to be my
own work but steered me in the right the direction whenever he thought I needed it.

I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Ali Moshtagh and Dr. James Bruehler of the
Department of Economics at Eastern Illinois University as the other readers of this thesis,
and I am gratefully for their very valuable comments and insights on this thesis.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents and to my husband,
Steven Baker, for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement
throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this
thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them.

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

3

TABLE OF CONTENT
ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................2
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................4
LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................4
CHAPTER ONE ..................................................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................5
CHAPTER TWO ...............................................................................................................13
LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................................13
Models Used ..............................................................................................................13
Variables Used ...........................................................................................................15
CHAPTER III ....................................................................................................................18
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................18
Probit Model ..............................................................................................................19
Poisson Regression Model .........................................................................................22
CHAPTER IV ....................................................................................................................26
DATA AND RESULTS ................................................................................................26
Test of stationarity and cointegration ........................................................................29
Test of collinearity .....................................................................................................30
Probit Model ..............................................................................................................31
Poisson Regression Model .........................................................................................35
FORECASTING ............................................................................................................39
Probit Forecasting ......................................................................................................39
Poisson Forecasting ...................................................................................................40
CHAPTER V .....................................................................................................................42
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................42
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................45
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................50

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

4

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Ratio of U.S. households net worth vs. GDP quarterly by index scale value 100
of 1951 (1951 – 2019) ........................................................................................................50
Figure 2: Stock Market Capitalization to GDP for U.S. with Buffet Indicators (1975 –
2017) ..................................................................................................................................51
Figure 3: Monetary base vs. Currency in circulation (1941 – 2018)................................52
Figure 4: Unemployment rate (1948 – 2018) ....................................................................53
Figure 5: Yield Curve by quarter (1953 – 2018) ...............................................................54
Figure 6: Effective Federal Funds Rate by quarter (1950 – 2018) ...................................55
Figure 7: Actual number of Quarters (diffdays) till the next recession quarterly (1950 –
2018) ..................................................................................................................................56
Figure 8: Actual vs. predicted Recession from Probit Regression quarterly ....................57
Figure 9: Predicted vs. actual numbers of quarters till the next recession by Poisson
Model .................................................................................................................................58

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 ...............................................................................................................................24
Table 2 ...............................................................................................................................26
Table 3 ...............................................................................................................................29
Table 4 ...............................................................................................................................30
Table 5 ...............................................................................................................................31
Table 6 ...............................................................................................................................32
Table 7 ...............................................................................................................................33
Table 8 ...............................................................................................................................34
Table 9 ...............................................................................................................................35
Table 10 .............................................................................................................................37
Table 11 .............................................................................................................................37
Table 12 .............................................................................................................................41

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

5

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Many have known or experienced the economic downfall arising from the 2008
financial crisis, which is regarded as the worst economic disaster since 1929 despite the
preventive efforts of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Congress (Amadeo, 2018).
Amadeo (2018) argued that the crisis was rooted in the Gramm-Rudman Act that allowed
banks to trade derivatives and use mortgage-backed securities as collateral. The banks
then chopped up the original mortgages and resold mortgage tranches (Amadeo, 2018).
This action is a form of monetary debasement even though debasement is usually referred
to when issuance of large amounts of money made for the government to access greater
resources leads to higher inflation and lower value of money.
One of the main causes of the Great Recession in 2008 was Collagenized Debt
Obligations (CDOs), or basically a type of junk bonds that include subprime mortgagebacked securities, triple-B mezzanine tranches, warehoused to launder into new triple-A
tranches (McLean & Nocera, 2010). The main problem with CDOs was that a very low
rated stock could become a very high rated stock as multiple collaterals of debts were
allowed to be transformed based on different collators. Another serious problem
preceding the crisis was when the subprime lending provided borrowers with mortgages
requiring 10% or less for down payment which was also known to and accepted by the
Federal Reserve and the Wall Street (McLean & Nocera, 2010). In addition, this problem
was serious to the point that the lenders’ agents even reported wrong information, such as
income of borrowers, and placed few restrictions on borrowers in order to issue more
mortgages which was to create more sales (McLean & Nocera, 2010). At the end, those
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borrowers couldn’t pay their payments when the deadline came. Those lenders even tried
to come to those borrowers’ houses to collect payments, but nobody lived there (McLean
& Nocera, 2010). The borrowers got their houses so easily, but the house prices fell so
much that they did not find it worthwhile to keep paying mortgages based on higher
valued houses. This system (CDOs) started to provide misinformation for small
investors.
However, the original idea of this creation seemed admirable. It was to encourage
homeownership in the U.S.A. According to Shiller (2008, p5), this rate went up by
11.5% over the period 1997 - 2005. Owning a house had never been easier because there
were few requirements to qualify for a mortgage. The idea was, however, over-promoted
and caused a problem. The largest increase in homeownership was from “the West, for
those under the age of 35, for those with below-median incomes, and for Hispanic and
blacks” (Shiller, 2008). This basically means the younger age, lower income, and
minority group were the major group who had their hands-on big money in an easy way
for a short period of time. Things started to get out of control when many borrowers had
little ability to pay back their easy loans. It would be a miracle for a $30,000 income
household to pay off a mortgage of a $300,000 house.
Figure 1 (Appendices) compares the GDP which represents the market value
based on all final goods and services produced and the U.S. households’ net worth which
represents household wealth by a ratio of the U.S. households’ net worth to the GDP. To
understand how Figure 1 is created, it’s important to know what the U.S. household net
worth is. This net worth is the resale (current) value of assets minus the outstanding
loans and interests where the assets include real estate as well as financial assets such as
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mutual funds, bonds, and stocks. This shows that the value of household net worth, and
particularly financial assets, can fluctuate widely in a short period of time. When the
household wealth is significantly higher than the market wealth, bubbles will be created
which is shown in Figure 1. Each recession tends to happen at the end of each inverted U
shape of the ratio. The most obvious bubbles are the Real estate bubble in 2008, the dotcom bubble in 2001, and the savings & loan (S&L) in 1990 even though the inverted U
shape of the ratio is less obvious in the previous recessions. Figure 1 shows it is very
possible that the last bubble (2011-2017) is about half way till it bursts and there is a very
high possibility that it will burst anytime soon then create the next recession.
Indeed, many economists warned a recession in the next 10 years (since 2008)
would throw us off due to the growing U.S. budget deficit (Turak, 2018). Maloney (Gold
& Silver: Why I'm Buying The Safe-Haven Assets, Right Now, 2019) believed that the
next recession is going to burst in a near future as the U.S. household net worth will
skyrocket. The future bubble, as he suspected, will be a lot bigger than both the Dot-com
and the real estate bubbles that he called it the “everything bubble” (Figure 1). Even Bill
Gates, the billionaire Founder of Microsoft, firmly agreed that there would be another
financial crisis as hard as the one in 2008 (Turak, 2018). However, the real question is
when the next recession will be expected to actually happen and that is what this paper is
mainly focusing on.
To elaborate the suspicion about the near future recession, this paper will use
Buffet Indicator (BI) that is shown in Figure 2 (Appendices). The BI was invented by
Warren Edward Buffett, who is considered the most successful investor in the world.
The BI is a very quick and simple way to observe how the current market is valued.
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Warren Buffet also claimed the BI is “the best single measure of where valuations stand
at any given moment” (Langlois, 2018). Langlois (2018) explained that “the indicator is
the total market cap of all U.S. stocks relative to the country’s GDP” (Langlois, 2018).
According to the Buffet Indicators (Figure 2), the value of BI is divided into five major
groups of range that is represented in Figure 2. To simplify the concept, according to
investors’ point of view, when the BI is under 90%, it is safe to invest (prefer buying to
selling) and when the BI is greater than 90%, it is better to sell your market shares.
Based on the BI concept, when the ratio of market capitalization to GDP is greater than
90%, the economy is in a bubble as the market is significantly overvalued. Figure 2
shows that the market capitalization is significantly overvalued (132.6%). This indicates
the current economy is already in a bubble. However, the market has been overvalued
since 1995 while recessions had happened within any of the five indicators (from
significantly undervalued to significant overvalued). Therefore, it’s very challenging to
use BI to predict the market even though it provides a great short-term signal.
Meanwhile, an interesting thing from Figure 2 is that every time a recession occurred, the
market was normalized to be closer to its fair value (75% - 90%). When the market was
undervalued, it would increase during a recession; when the market was overvalued, it
would decrease during a recession. However, this whole analogy doesn’t provide much
predictive power for a recession, but it does raise a concern that the next recession is
coming soon.
Figure 3 (Appendices) compares the money base (St. Louis Adjusted Monetary
Base) and the money that the public is using (Currency in Circulation). Currency in
circulation includes paper currency and coin held both by the public and in the vaults of
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depository institutions while the Adjusted Monetary Base is the sum of currency
(including coins) in circulation outside Federal Reserve Banks and the U.S. Treasury,
plus deposits held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks. Since 1990, there
has been a very small gap between the two measurements then a sudden big gap after
2008. Till 2009, there was a huge gap between the two measurements. This gap means
that the money that public is using is less than the available money. The gap also
represents the money in the reserves, that refers to an excess reserve that is deposited in
institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, etc. which also bought Treasury
bonds, mortgage-backed securities. The problem with these reserves is that those
securities or bonds can be very risky and low graded. The Fed has been attempting to
close the gap between the two measurements (money base and money used) since 2017
as shown in Figure 3 because the economy has started to stabilize.
However, the problem is how the Fed is doing it. The Fed attempted to use
quantitative easing (QE) three times by purchasing securities in order to lower interest
rates and increase money supply: QE3 in 2012, QE2 in 2010, and QE1 in 2008
(Chronology of Fed's Quantitative Easing & Tightening). According to Figure 3, the
reserves (gap between money base and currency in circulation) went down or stabilized
during QE2 an QE3 while the reserves went up during QE1. This raises a concern that
the deposit might have been much greater without the QE1. When the Fed terminated Q3
in 2014 and Q2 in 2012, the reserves went up simultaneously (Figure 3). However, when
the Fed terminated Q1 in 2010, the reserves decreased (stabilized) but then increased
significantly (Figure 3). In 2017, the Fed decided to normalize the balance sheets in
order to close up the gap by basically selling off its assets (Treasury securities and bonds)
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to get cash then destroying the cash (Federal Reserve press release, 2017). This
eventually will decrease the price of bonds as the supply of bonds is increasing and the
demand for bonds is decreasing because of less cash to pay for those supplied bonds.
This will water down the liquidity of the government’s assets.
On the other hand, according to the Federal Reserve data, the deficit of the
government budget in the last quarter of 2018 was about $0.8 trillion even though the
deficit reached its climax of $1.4 trillion after the Great recession in 2008. That means
the government has spent $0.8 trillion more than it takes in from taxes. The deficit has
never been this high before the 2008 financial crisis. Our concern about this issue is
whether the government can soften the next recession by increasing the deficit even
more. The fact is that Federal budget decreased (deficit increased) during most
recessions and the deficit has started to increase (the budget decreased) since 2015,
according to the Federal Reserve data. However, there is no certain pattern of the
government budget before a recession that can signal a recession.
Something, which is very interesting from the data collected, is the effective
federal funds rate (EFFR) as shown in Figure 6 (Appendices). The EFFR was kept to
almost zero after the 2008 Great Recession till 2017, which is about 35 quarters or 105
months (almost 10 years). This is the longest zero bound interest rate in the financial
market history of the U.S.A. since 1950. This could be an after-effect of the Great
Recession in 2008. This recession lasted for 6 quarters or 18 months which was the
longest recession in the post-war history of the U.S.A. The main cause of the Great
Recession in 2008 was the housing (real estate) bubble. The Federal Reserve has kept the
interest rate low with a belief that it will prevent the next economic downturn. This study
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will discuss more on whether the lower bound interest rate can either increase or decrease
the probability of a recession.
Another important economic measurement is unemployment rate as shown in
Figure 4 (Appendices). According to Figure 4, at the end of 2018, the unemployment
rate was under 4%, which was the lowest rate since 1969. During every recession (the
grey area of Figure 4), the unemployment rate has always increased. Before every
recession, the unemployment rate tends to stay very low then increase a bit. Figure 4
shows that an inverted curve of unemployment (low unemployment rate then a bit of an
increase) occurs before each recession. Many economists believe that the low
unemployment rate will only last beyond 2019 because of the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act, which slashed corporate taxes, and an enlarged federal spending package (Turak,
2018). Therefore, this could be considered as a sign of a near future recession as the
unemploment rate is a bit curved up at the end of 2018 (Figure 4).
Much previous literature indicates that yield curve, which is the difference
between long-term and short-term interest rate, has a significant impact on the probability
of a recession. Figure 5 (Appendices) shows in terms of quarterly data how yield curve
responded before, during, and after each recession (NBER) from 1953 to 2018.
According to Figure 5, the yield curve tends to invert in an U shape before each
recession. Figure 5 shows half of an inverted U shape in the end of 2018. This could be
another sign of a near future recession. Indeed, many forecasters worry about the
flattening of the yield curve because it suggests a soon-to-occur recession (Turak, 2018).
However, investment professional like Saker Nusseibeh, the chief executive at Hermes
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Investment Management, is expecting the curve to steepen so that the inflation and
interest rates will be higher, signaling a stronger economy (Turak, 2018).
This paper focuses on data analysis to explore objective causes of a recession,
rather than more anecdotal investor stories leading to a recession. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature on how recession occurs and how researchers estimate models to predict a
recession. Chapter 3 sets up models, describes data used in model estimation, and
discusses results. Chapter 4 attempts the forecasting of the next recession based on the
estimated models. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main themes coming
out of this research including policy implications and indicates directions for future
research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Models Used
There is a fairly long history behind macroeconomic theories of economic
fluctuations. In recent times, New Keynesian, and Real Business Cycle theories have
become prominent. Because of the assumption of short-run stickiness in nominal wages
and prices which prevent their quick adjustment in the face of slowing demand, the new
Keynesian models have become popular among central bankers and other macro
forecasters.
This thesis is, however, about empirical modelling of recessions, and forecasting
recessions. To this end, Filardo (1999) compared five different models: simple rules of
thumb using the Conference Board’s composite index of leading indicators (CLI), Neftçi
model, Probit model, GDP forecasting model, and Stock-Watson model. Filardo (1999)
didn’t specify which model could forecast the best as each model has its own pros and
cons. However, in terms of their ability to forecast an imminent recession, he favored
three models ‒ Probit model, GDP Forecasting model, and Stock-Watson model (Filardo,
1999). Plakandaras et al. (2017) compared Probit model with Support Vector Machines
(SVM) and concluded that the probit models can foresee the U.S. recession periods more
closely than SVM models for up to 6 months ahead while the SVM models are more
accurate at longer horizons. However, Plakandaras et al. (2017) found that SVM models
can discriminate between recessions and tranquil periods better than probit ones. On the
other hand, Filardo (1999) emphasized that recession signals are the clearest when all the
models are in an agreement.
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Literature shows greater popularity of Probit models to forecast recession because
of the limited nature of the dependent variable, that is, whether the economy at any point
is either in recession or not in recession (King et al., 2007; Chauvet & Potter, 2005; Silvia
et al., 2008; and Shoesmith, 2003; among others). In these models the dependent variable
takes the value 1 if there is a recession in the current period, and 0 if not. The zero value
could indicate all other stages of the economy such as recovery, slow or fast expansion,
and the peak. One of the advantages of the Probit model is the superiority of the ordered
probit framework to forecast all of the phases of a business cycle up to six months ahead
under real-time conditions (Proaño & Tarassow, 2018). The other advantage is that the
probit model allows analysts to create new composite indexes of leading indicators and
evaluate them one at time or jointly (Filardo, 1999). The model also allows the business
cycle analysts to identify the most informative set of recession indicators for a given
forecast horizon (short horizon is preferred to long horizon) (Filardo, 1999). However,
Filardo (1999) believed the probit model might miss a few recessions that exhibit unusual
lead times.
The Stock-Watson model is similar to GDP forecasting model since they both try
to predict recessions by forecasting consecutive declines in GDP by using a multiequation regression model called a vector autoregression (VAR) (Filardo, 1999). A
recession signal is when there are two consecutive quarterly declines in GDP (Filardo,
1999). However, the Stock-Watson model included a broader measure of economic
activity and compared the forecasts with their elaborate up-and-down pattern, called the
Experimental Recession Index (Filardo, 1999). Filardo (1999) found that the model
might be consistent only when NBER is equal to 1 (recession). In the Stock-Watson
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model, Filardo (1999) used seven leading indicators: new private housing building
permits, durable goods industries' unfilled orders, trade-weighted exchange rate, parttime employment because of slack work, 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yield,
credit interest rate spread, and term interest rate spread to capture the institutional process
of the NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee. These seven leading indicators should
be useful in determining the independent variables for this study as well.
Variables Used
Most of the research uses the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to
define recessions such as King et al. (2007); Chauvet & Potter (2005); Anderson & Vahid
(2000); Filardo (1999); Silvia et al. (2008); Shoesmith (2003); Plakandaras et al. (2017).
According to Meyer (1980), “the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has
developed a generally accepted procedure for dating the peaks and troughs of business
cycles” (Meyer, 1980). “The NBER procedure takes into account the movements of a
large number of aggregate time series and identifies cyclical turning points on the basis of
the amplitude, duration, and the degree of diffusion of the movements in the various time
series” (Meyer, 1980). In simpler words, the value is 1 when the economy is in recession
and the value is 0 when the economy is not in recession. A recession occurs when there
is “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more
than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial
production, and wholesale-retail sales” (Plakandaras et al., 2017). This definition
suggests a good set of variables to use to forecast recessions.
The yield curve has been used to forecast recessions in many papers such as King
et al. (2007), Chauvet & Potter (2005), Anderson & Vahid (2000), Filardo (1999), Silvia
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et al.(2008), Shoesmith (2003), and Plakandaras et al. (2017). The exact variable is the
difference between the long term and the short term Treasury bond rate. The financial
analysts suggest that the greater the spread, the higher probability that the economy is in a
recession because bigger spreads indicate higher risk. However, the economists suggest a
flatter curve (smaller spread) indicates a weaker growth while a steeper one (bigger
spread) indicates a stronger growth.
Filardo (1999) and Dueker (2005) use composite index of leading indicators
(CLI) in their models. CLI includes 10 elements: manufacturing hours worked, consumer
expectations, stock price, initial unemployment claims, building permits, money supply,
difference of long-term and short-term interest rate in government securities, vendor
performance, manufacturing orders for capital goods, and manufacturing orders for
consumer goods. Dueker (2005) shows that two or three months of declines in CLI could
signal at least 1.3% that the economy is in recession.
A negative real GDP growth is a part of the recession definition and is
recommended by King et al. (2007); Chauvet & Potter (2005); Anderson & Vahid
(2000); Filardo (1999); Silvia et al. (2008); and Shoesmith (2003); etc. Kilian &
Vigfusson (2013) claimed that capital stock along with population and technology are the
main drivers of long-run growth (real GDP). Kilian & Vigfusson (2013) found oil prices
increases matter to one-quarter-ahead U.S. real GDP to the extent they exceed the
maximum oil price in recent years while oil price decreases do not matter at all. Since a
consecutive 2-quarter decline in GDP is the definition of recession (Filardo, 1999), the
results from the two papers, and Kilian & Vigfusson (2013), are able to suggest more
variables. The higher the GDP growth, the less likely the economy is in a recession
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stage. Anderson & Vahid (2000) included growth in M2 together with interest rate
spread (yield spread), GDP growth, and growth in M2 in their model to forecast
recessions. However, they find that the marginal contribution of M2 growth in preceding
recessions, conditional on the spread, is negligible. On the other hand, Plakandaras et al.
(2017) confirmed oil prices (in their natural logarithm form), stock returns and the yield
spread as leading indicators that provided the most accurate forecating models for
recession.
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CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This paper will use two different models to forecast recessions as there will be

two different dependent variables: one is to predict recessions and the other is to predict
how long it will be before the next recession will occur. In a quarterly model, when there
is a recession, the dependent variable for that quarter takes the value 1, otherwise it is 0.
Because of the binary dependent variable, a Probit model will be an appropriate model of
analysis. For the second model that looks at the length of time before the next recession,
the dependent variable (quarters) will count numbers of periods (quarters) till the nearest
future recession. Poisson would be an appropriate model to analyze count data of this
kind. As far as independent variables are concerned, most of them are selected in this
thesis as suggested by the existing literature. Important among them are yield spread,
leading indicator index, GDP, inflation, broad money, effective federal funds rate, oil
price, and unemployment rate.
Since our U.S. data is time series, before estimating the models, it will be
important to perform the test of stationarity in order to obtain sensible results based on
stationary variables. This study will apply Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to check
the stationarity of each variable. Before applying the ADF test, it is important to
determine the correct number of lags to eliminate any autocorrelation in the data. We
determine the numbers of lags for each variable (using the varsoc command in Stata). As
long as the coefficient of each incrementing lag is statistically significant consecutively,
that should be the ideal number of lags in the ADF regression. The VAR model is as
follows:
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑣𝑡

where y is the vector of dependent variables and p indicates the number of common lags
in each equation. For variables to be stationary, the test statistics in the ADF need to be
statistically significant. The ADF regression will look like the following:
𝑝

∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡 ,

𝜃 =𝜌−1

𝑗=1

When the two series are I(1) but their linear combination is I(0), the regression of
one on the other is not spurious but says something about the long-run relationship
between the two series. Therefore, in most cases for time series date, the next step is to
perform test of cointegration. However, as the nature of the both dependent variables in
Probit and Poisson models is limited, this problem might not apply. Moreover, each
variable has different unit roots. The test of cointegration will be less likely to be
applicable.
Probit Model
We use the Probit model to forecast recessions mainly because the model ensures
that the estimated response probabilities are strictly between zero and one. The study
also considers two interaction terms: percent change in real Gross Domestic Product
(GDPG) & percent change in composite leading indicators (Leading), and percent change
in real Gross Domestic Product (GDPG) & consumer price index (Infla). The first
interaction term is included because some elements in leading indicator index could
control GDP growth at some levels and some elements in GDP growth could control
Leading. Camacho (2004) and Graff (2010) showed that the leading indicator index
could improve the forecasts of the GDP growth. The second interaction term is included
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because both consumer price index (Infla) and GDP growth (GDPG) measure price
changes in goods and services purchased by consumers, businesses, governments, etc.
However, GDP is calculated at a fixed price while consumer price index is calculated at a
fixed basket of goods. Moreover, GDP doesn’t include imports bought by domestics as
consumer price index does. As a result, the effect of leading indicator index and
consumer price index on the likelihood of a recession will change as GDP changes.
However, these interactions terms will be dropped off the model if the results don’t show
much improvement through the goodness of fit and the percent correctly predicted (PCP)
measures.
In the Probit model, the main reason, that GDP growth (GDPG), unemployment
rate (Unemp), and Industrial Production (IndProd) are in a lag form, is because those
variables are part of the definition of a recession. It would make more sense to use past
values of those variables to forecast recessions. When real GDP growth or Industrial
Production decreases, or unemployment rate increases consecutively for two or more
quarters, a recession occurs. Hence, the number of lags (h) will be 2.
The Probit model will look like following:
𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 1|𝑋)
= 𝐺[𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽6 M2G𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐶ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑡−2 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡−ℎ
+ 𝛽10 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡−ℎ × 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 ) + 𝛽11 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡−ℎ × 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡 )]
= 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷) = 𝐺(𝑧)
where G is the standard normal cumulative distribution (c.d.f.) so that G can only take on
values strictly between zero and one for all real number z (Wooldridge, 2012), and h
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indicates the number of lags. The G function is increasing the most quickly at z = 0. The
closer to 0 the values of the G function are, the larger negative the number z is. In
addition, the closer to 1 the values of G function are, the larger positive the number z is.
The G function looks as follows:
𝑧

𝑧

𝐺(𝑧) = Φ(𝑧) = ∫ 𝜙(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 = ∫
−∞

−∞

𝑒

−𝑧2
2

√2𝜋

𝑑𝑧

The dependent variable in the Probit model is rather not the direct value itself but
in a logit form (logarithm of ratio of probability of a recession to probability of a nonrecession). Therefore, the coefficients from the Probit model are not the marginal effects
of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Since the independent variables
are continuous, the marginal effect for each independent variable is as follows:
𝜕𝑝(𝑥) 𝜕𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷)
=
= 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷)𝛽𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑧)𝛽𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
As the function g(z), called the scale factor, is always positive, the sign of marginal
effects of each independent variable is the sign of its coefficient (βj). However, the
magnitude of the effect of each independent variable depends on all independent
variables’ coefficients as well as the scale factor g(z). Moreover, the scale factor g(z),
here is the c.d.f. of the G function or standard normal cumulative distribution function.
This is important to get the marginal effect of each independent variable. The following
equation shows how the marginal effect of a variable is calculated in the Probit model.
−𝑧2

𝜕𝑝(𝑥)
𝑒 2
= 𝑔(𝑧)𝛽𝑗 = 𝛷[𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷)]𝛽𝑗 = 𝛷(𝐺(𝑧))𝛽𝑗 =
𝛽𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
√2𝜋
The marginal effect can be calculated by plugging in any values of the
independent variables to get the z value or the G function then use the above function to
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calculate the marginal effect for each independent variable. The equation shows that
different quarters will produce different marginal effects of each independent variable
because each quarter has different values of z or the predicted G function. The problem
in doing this is that there will be too many possible numbers of marginal effect for each
independent variable.
Because of the nonlinear nature of the G function, the marginal effect of a
variable, also called partial effect at the average (PEA), is normally evaluated at the mean
values of each independent variable. Alternatively, the marginal effect or the average
partial effect (APE) of a variable is calculated for each observation in the sample and
then the mean of those effects is reported as the APE. The APE, indeed, is preferred to
the PEA because it has the scale factor, g(z), that uses all predicted values from the G
function. The following equation shows how APE is calculated.
̂ )𝛽̂𝑗 ]
∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑔(𝛽̂0 + 𝒙𝜷
𝑛

̂ )]
∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑔(𝛽̂0 + 𝒙𝜷
∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑔(𝑧)]
̂
=
𝛽𝑗 =
𝛽̂𝑗
𝑛
𝑛

Poisson Regression Model
The Probit model predicts whether a recession will or will not occur in a given
period. When the next recession will occur can only be inferred indirectly by looking at
what it predicts in subsequent periods after creating scenarios for each of the independent
variables. There is no direct forecast of the number of quarters in which the next
recession is likely to occur. To solve this problem, this paper created another variable
called quarters that measures how many more quarters from today will elapse till the
onset of the next recession. The quarters variable will count the number of quarters from
the end of the previous recession to the start of the next recession. When the economy is
in a recession, the dependent variable (quarters) will be zero. Since the dependent
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variable has a count feature and is nonnegative, we use a Poisson Regression Model that
takes as an exponential function to find out how much time on average will elapse from
today till the next recession.
𝐸(quarters) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡−ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡
+ 𝛽6 M2G𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐶ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑡−2
+ 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡−ℎ ]
= 𝑒 𝑋𝛽 = 𝜆
The Poisson model determines the probability that the dependent variable, quarters,
equals a count value, di, conditional on all the above listed independent variables as
follows:
𝑑

𝑋𝛽

𝑑

𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝜆𝑖 𝑖 𝑒 −𝑒 𝑒 𝑋𝛽 𝑖
𝑃(quarters|quarters = 𝑑𝑖 ) =
=
,
𝑑𝑖 !
𝑑𝑖 !

𝑑𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, ….

Since the dependent variable in the Poisson Model is transformed to the
exponential form, the coefficient of each independent variable in the model is not the
marginal effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. Because the
Poisson is also nonlinear, there are two ways to get the marginal effects as in the Probit
model. However, the Poisson function is different from the Probit function, hence the
scale factor to calculate the marginal effect is also different. As all the independent
variables are continuous, the marginal effect is calculated as following:
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑥𝑖)
̂
= 𝜆𝑖 𝛽̂𝑗 = 𝑒 𝑋𝛽 𝛽̂𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝑖
To get the partial effect at the average (PEA), as in the Probit model, we take the average
of each independent variable to get the predicted values in the Poisson function then take
the exponential of it as in the above equation. But the difference from the G function for
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Probit also makes Poisson’s average partial effect (APE) slightly different as given
below:
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝛽̂
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜆̂𝑖
𝛽̂𝑗 =
𝛽̂𝑗
𝑛
𝑛
In the Poisson model, the coefficients (β’s) can be estimated by maximum
likelihood (ML). The likelihood function for the dependent variable is the joint

probability function of the observed data. The overall significance of the model depends
on the estimated log-likelihood as follows:
𝑛

𝑛

𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ 𝑙𝑖 (𝛽) = ∑{𝑦𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 − 𝑒 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 − log(𝑦𝑖 }
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

The Probit and Poisson models will be estimated by using data for the variables listed and
defined in Table 1:
Table 1
Description of Model Variables
Name
Unit
Description
Recess
n/a
Average of Base Recession Indicators for the U.S. the
Period following the peak through the Trough (NBER)
Recessb
Binary
NBER in binary
Quarters
Quarters
Number of quarters till the next recession
Spread
Percent
10-year Treasury constant maturity interest rate minus 3month Treasury constant maturity rate
Leading
Percent
Leading Indicators OECD: Leading indicators: CLI: Trend
Change
restored for the U.S.
GDPG
Percent
Percent change from previous quarter of Real Gross
Change
Domestic Product
Infla
Rate
Growth rate from previous quarter of Consumer Price
Index for the U.S.
M2G
Percent
Percent change of M2 Money stock
FFFRCh
Percent
First differencing of Effective Federal Funds Rate
OilPCh
Dollars per First differencing of Spot crude oil price: West Texas
barrel
Intermediate (WTI) in natural logarithm form
IndProd
Percent
Percent change in Industrial Production: mining: crude oil
UnempCh
Percent
First differencing of Civilian unemployment rate

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.
Note: Most independent variables are measured in percentage change form (or growth
rate)
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND RESULTS
All data is collected from the Federal Reserve Database (FRED) quarterly from
1950 to 2018. As observed, the number of observations for each variable is different
mainly because of its data availability. This means that the actual number of
observations for the model will be based on the least number of observations. In this

case, there will be 187 observations as the Industrial Production has data for the shortest
time span. However, the Industrial Production variable is at the second lag; hence, the
sample size in the Probit model will be 185. In the Probit function, the oil price is used in
a logarithmic form because of its larger values than the rest of the variables. The use of
oil price in logarithms allows the marginal effect to be interpreted in the percent change
than the dollar change.
Table 2:
Summary Statistics of all variables (1950-2018 quarterly)
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. De.
Recess
278
.133
.323
Recessb
276
.134
.324
Spread
262
-.588
7.087
Leading
235
.750
.684
GDPG
276
3.294
3.834
Infla
236
.918
.816
M2G
239
1.651
.816
FFRCh
258
4.814
3.587
log(oil)
276
2.616
1.231
Unemp
276
5.788
1.636
IndProd
187
.148
2.454

Min
0
0
-35.216
-2.374
-10
-2.829
-2.829
.073
.944
2.567
-11.164

Max
1
1
27.937
2.554
16.7
3.951
3.951
17.78
4.820
10.667
8.872

In Table 2, Recess is measured in terms of the fraction of a quarter. Hence,
Recess has four possible values: 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1. When Recess equals to .33, it
means that one third of the quarter is in a recession. A value of 0.67 means two thirds of

Forecasting recessions in the U.S.A.

27

the quarter is in recession. By looking at whether the previous or the following quarter
has a recession, it should be simple enough to tell which month is in a recession.
According to the data, the 0 value of Recess appears 233 times; the .33 value of Recess
appears 4 times and the .67 value of Recess appears 10 times; and the 1 value of Recess
appears 29 times during the period of 1950 - 2018. Statistically speaking, a total of (111
months or) 37 quarters are recession quarters, which translates to 13.40% of the overall
sample period of 1950‒2018, equal to the average of the Recess variable.
To make the data fit with the nature of the Recess values, it is possible to
transform Recess into a binary form shown as Recessb in Table 2. Recessb is one if the
average value is greater than 0.5, else it is 0. After the transformation (Recessb), there
are total of 39 quarters (14.13%) of recession out of 276 quarters in the sample.
However, the Industrial Production (IndProd) series only started from 1972. Hence our
sample is restricted to 1972Q2‒2018Q4. According to the data, Recess takes the value
zero 160 times, 0.33 twice, 0.67 5 times; and 120 times during 1972‒2018. This means
we have 24 quarters of recessions, or 12.83% of total. Generally speaking, it can be said
that the economy is more stable in the period of 1972 - 2018 than in the period of 1950 2018. This makes sense because the U.S. economy has gained from policy improvements
than in prior periods.
The effective Federal Funds Rate can measure most of the change in monetary
policy (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). It is often that the government lowers the interest
rates (monetary easing) when the economy is not doing well in order to increase
aggregate demand (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). As a result, GDP tends to increase when
the effective Federal Funds Rate is lowered. Therefore, the lower the effective Federal
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Funds Rate, the higher the chance of a recession, which means the coefficient of the
effective Federal Funds Rate should be expected to be negative. However, Laopodis
(2006) found that monetary easing or monetary tightening is not necessary to improve
stock returns and economic activity. Therefore, the sign of effective Federal Funds Rate
might not be statistically significant as well as negative, as expected.
A change in the consumer price index (Infla) measures the average percentage
change in CPI or, in simple terms, inflation. Higher inflation generally signals a stronger
economy (Turak, 2018), meaning the coefficient of the inflation is expected to be
negative. This is true in most cases when the level of aggregate demand in an economy
outpaces aggregate supply triggering a demand pull inflation. During such a period, the
purchasing power of consumers could be the main driver in the market from an increase
in employment levels as an example. This clearly explains Turak’s claim that higher
inflation signals a stronger economy as the employment levels increase. However, the
aggregate supply could decrease due to an increase in cost of production such as raw
materials, labor, and other inputs leading to a cost push inflation. Therefore, such an
inflationary situation worsens the economy making the coefficient of inflation positive.
As a result, the expected sign for the coefficient of CPI will depend on the behavior of
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. Hence, it is undetermined.
The higher the leading indicator index (Leading), GDP growth (GDPG), and
industrial production (IndProd), the lower will be the probability that a recession will
happen because the economy will then be performing better. As a result, the coefficients
of those variables are expected to be negative. However, the marginal effects of Leading,
and GDPG not only depend on their own coefficients but also the coefficients of the
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interaction terms. Therefore, the signs of these coefficients are uncertain. Moreover,

GDP growth is what determines whether there is a recession. It would be tautological to
use current GDP to explain a current recession. Therefore, it should make sense to apply
lags of GDP.
According to King et al. (2007), Chauvet & Potter (2005), Anderson & Vahid
(2000), Filardo (1999), Silvia et al. (2008), Shoesmith (2003), and Plakandaras et al.
(2017), among others, a wider yield spread makes a recession more likely to happen. As
steeper yield curve means stronger economy, the sign of the yield spread’s coefficient
should be expected to be negative as the bigger value of yield spread increases the risk of
a recession. Another important element to forecast a recession is the unemployment rate.
A higher or rising unemployment will increase the probability of a recession. Therefore,
the coefficient of unemployment rate is expected to be positive.
Test of stationarity and cointegration
The null hypothesis in an augmented Dickey-Fuller type test is that the variable is
non-stationary. Therefore, the variables whose coefficients are statistically significant
would be stationary. Table 3 shows the augmented Dickey-Fuller results. There are two
nonstationary variables: the effective federal funds rates (FFR), and oil price per barrel
(OilP). Moreover, the p-value for unemployment rate (Unemp) is very close to 0.05.
Therefore, it is better to do error correction by first differencing for the three variables:
FFRCh, OilPCh, and UnempCh.
Table 3
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and conclusions
Variables
Test statistics
p-value
Recess
-7.702
.0000***
Spread
-5.175
.0001***

Conclusion
Stationary
Stationary
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Leading
-5.696
.0000***
Stationary
GDPG
-8.707
.0000***
Stationary
Infla
-6.493
.0000***
Stationary
M2G
-6.708
.0000***
Stationary
FFR
-2.809
.1937
Non-stationary
log(oil)
-2.277
.4466
Non-stationary
Unemp
-3.596
.0302**
Stationary
IndProd
-8.858
.0000***
Stationary
Note. (*) Significant at the p<0.1 level, (**) Significant at the p<0.05 level, (***)
Significant at the p<0.01 level
Test of collinearity
It’s also important to make sure all variables are not highly correlated to each

other, especially to the dependent variable (NBER). The problem of multicollinearity is
that the results will be overvalued. According to Table 4, the variables are not too highly
correlated as the absolute values of all correlations are not higher than 0.8. However,
because of the discreate characteristics of the dependent variable, the rule of thumb for a
bad collinearity might not be applicable. However, the correlation matrix still brings a
good support for the Probit regression results later on.
Table 4
Correlation matrix
Variables
(1)
(1) Recess
1.000
(2) Spread
0.307
(3) Leading
0.478
(4) GDPG
0.464
(5) Infla
0.006
(6) M2G
0.170
(7) FFECh
(8) OilPCh
(9)
UnempCh

0.222
0.226
0.628

(2)
1.000
0.229
0.293
0.103
0.240
0.362
0.149
0.338

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.000
0.588

1.000

0.016
0.010
0.026
0.216

0.247

1.000

0.042

0.026

1.000

0.278

0.453

0.193

0.517

0.422

0.599

0.087

0.156
0.211
0.112

1.000
0.233

1.000

0.292

0.195

1.000
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(10)
IndProd

0.010

0.088

0.051

0.028

0.215

0.042

0.012

0.131

0.111

Probit Model
According to Table 5, Leading, Infla, FFRCh, and UnempCh variables are
statistically significant at the 5% significant level in the model without the two
interaction terms. However, the Infla variable is no longer statistically significant in the
model with the interaction terms. The negative sign of coefficient of the FFRCh variable
is caused by the Fed’s reaction to a recession, lowering the interest.

Table 5
Probit Model Results
VARIABLES
Spread
Leading
GDPG
Infla
M2G
FFRCh
OilPCh
UnempCh
UndProd

(Without Interaction terms)
Recession

(With interaction terms)
recession

-0.0563
(0.0384)
-3.085***
(0.835)
-0.0332
(0.120)
0.696**
(0.312)
0.159
(0.336)
-1.828***
(0.483)
-1.343
(1.472)
3.834***
(1.381)
0.126
(0.145)

-0.0603
(0.0379)
-3.241***
(0.959)
-0.124
(0.186)
0.495
(0.466)
0.249
(0.359)
-1.757***
(0.479)
-0.937
(1.577)
4.263**
(1.771)
0.124
(0.162)
0.0877
(0.175)
0.0580
(0.0981)
-1.277
(0.863)

Grth*Leading
Grth*Infla
Constant

-1.409*
(0.768)
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Observations

185
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

185

Table 6 shows clearly the signs are as predicted. According to Table 6, most of
the signs are as predicted even though the sign for Industrial Production (IndProd) is not
as predicted. It makes sense that when the Industrial Production is greater, it means that
the industrial sector in mining for crude oil is doing well. The U.S. has been facing the
scarcity of crude oil for many years. Many products produced have been accommodated
to use less oil such as hybrid cars or electronic cars (Tesla). Because of the scarcity, the
oil price went up significantly. As a result, the demand for oil will go down as well. An
example is that national consumers have been adapted themselves by using smaller cars
and preferring electrical heaters. However, the coefficient of Industrial Production is not
statistically significant which means the Industrial Productions has little impact on a
recession.
Table 6
Sign of coefficients
Variable
Spread
Leading
GDPG
Infla
M2G
FFRCh
OilPCh
UnempCh
IndProd

Hypothesis
- or +
- or +
- or +
- or +
+
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results
-***
+**
+
-***
+***
+
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Table 7 shows and compares the overall significance of the two Probit models.

The interaction terms, indeed, improved the model overall (Table 7) but the improvement
is not significant. The Pseudo R-square is slightly improved with the interaction terms
(from 72.87% to 73.26%); the chi-square is also slightly improved from 112.06 to
112.66. On the other hand, the correctly predicted percent for both models are almost
identical (there might be a very small difference that couldn’t be shown by the round-up).
There is no improvement in correctly classified percent as well. Therefore, it is
appropriate to stay with the Probit model without the interaction terms. The model
overall predicts very well, 95.68%. Nevertheless, this might be a sign that the correctly
predicted percent in both Probit models are over-estimated. The reason is that there are
many variables used to determine a recession such as GDP growth (GDPG), Industrial
Production (IndProd), Leading Indicator Index (Leading), unemployment rate (Unemp),
and Consumer Price Index (Infla).
Table 7
Overall significant of Probit Model
Without Interaction
terms
Observations
185
Pseudo R2
.7287
LR chi2
112.06
Positive prediction value
91.30%
Correctly classified
95.68%

With interaction term
185
.7326
112.66
91.30%
95.68%

The results in Table 8 show each variable’s partial effect evaluated at the averages
for all of the independent variables. These averages are indeed calculated based on
observations for which all the variables have non-missing values. The marginal effects
retain the signs of the respective coefficients estimated by the Probit model and as shown
in Table 6. These effects are, however, statistically not significant. None of the variables
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seems important enough to affect probability of a recession. Thus, we move to a
discussion of another model.
Table 8
Partial effect at the average (PEA)
dy/dx Std.Err.
Spread
-0.001
0.001
Leading
-0.042
0.048
GDPG
-0.000
0.002
Infla
0.010
0.012
M2G
0.002
0.005
FFRCh
-0.025
0.029
OilPCh
-0.018
0.030
UnempCh
0.053
0.058
IndProd
0.002
0.003

z
-0.840
-0.880
-0.240
0.770
0.430
-0.860
-0.610
0.910
0.680

P>z
0.401
0.378
0.806
0.442
0.668
0.391
0.540
0.363
0.498

Mean
-0.632
0.661
2.813
0.977
1.596
-0.014
0.015
-0.010
0.088

The other method to get the marginal effects of independent variables on Recess
is APE. The scale factor can be calculated by applying the normal distribution, c.d.f.,
function in Stata (normalden) for all predicted values in the Probit model and then taking
the average as follows:
∑185
∑185
𝜕𝑝(𝑥) ∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑔(𝑧)]
𝑖=1[𝑔(𝑧)] ̂
𝑖=1 {[𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑛[(𝐺(𝑧))]]}
̂
=
𝛽𝑗 =
𝛽𝑗 =
= .5519𝛽̂𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑛
185
185
The scale factor for APE method can also be calculated manually by using the following
formula.
−𝑧2
2

∑185
𝜕𝑝(𝑥) ∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑔(𝑧)]
𝑖=1 [𝑔(𝑧)] ̂
̂
=
𝛽𝑗 =
𝛽𝑗 =
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑛
185

𝑒
∑185[

]
√2𝜋 𝛽̂ = .5519𝛽̂
𝑗
𝑗
185

𝑖=1

Both ways will give the same result for the scale factor values which is presented in
Table 9 with the coefficients in the Probit model and the PEA for a comparison purpose.
In general, the absolute values in APE approach (which is preferred) are greater than
those in PEA method. In the APE approach, the effect of leading indicators index
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(Leading) and the change in unemployment rate (UnempCh) are more significant as the
APE coefficients are greater than one. Again, however, these estimates are insignificant
statistically.
Table 9
Marginal effects to Recess from Probit
̂𝐣
APE
𝛃
Spread
-0.056
-0.021
Leading
-3.085
-1.705
GDPG
-0.033
-0.013
Infla
0.696
0.265
M2G
0.159
0.060
FFRCh
-1.828
-0.696
OilPCh
-1.343
-0.512
UnempCh
3.834
1.460
IndProd
0.126
0.048

PEA
-0.001
-0.042
-0.000
0.010
0.002
-0.025
-0.018
0.053
0.002

Poisson Regression Model
Our second model is a Poisson model which gives us a count of the number of
quarters it will take for the next recession to arrive conditional on the included variables.
Here, the estimated results are as follows:
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 2.610 + 0.020𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 0.822𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 0.011𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺 − 0.345𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎
(S.E.:) (0.073)
(0.006***)
(0.047***)
(0.011)
(0.044***)
−0.314𝑀2𝐺 + 0.071𝐷. 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐶ℎ − 0.280𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝐶ℎ − 0.382𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ + 0.028𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑
(0.029***)
(0.037*)
(0.203)
(0.112***)
(0.012**)
***p<0.01, **

p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in the last equation show that most of the coefficients are statistically
significant except for the GDP growth (GDPG) and the oil price (OilPCh). The
coefficient for leading indicator index (Leading), for instance, indicates that on average,
as the leading indicator index increases by 1 unit, the number of quarters till the next
recession will increase by 141.57%, [exp(.882)-1]*100, all else equal. As an example, a
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1 unit increase equals 0.4 standard deviation of the change in industrial production. This
means an improvement in leading indicator index will push the next recession further out
in the future. Another example is that, on average, a 1 unit increase in inflation rate
(Infla) means a 41.20% [exp(.345)-1]*100 decrease in numbers of quarters till the next
recession, all else qual. A 1 unit increase equals 1.23 standard deviation of the change in
inflation rate. This means an increase in inflation rate will pull the next recession closer
in the future.
The null hypothesis for the fit of the overall model is that the data are well
represented by the Poisson model. This is not true because of the large chi-square
(679.15) and low p-value. Yet our goal here is to see whether our variables have
significant effects on the mean number of quarters before the next recession. Figure 7
(Appendices) shows the actual period of time (quarters) before each recession.
Just as the Probit Model, in the Poisson Model, the coefficients are not the
marginal effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. Table 10 shows
the partial effect at the average of each independent variable. According to Table 10,
there are four independent variables that are statistically significant: leading indicator
index (Leading), Consumer Price Index (Infla), broad money (M2G), and unemployment
rate (UnempCh). When the leading indicator index (Leading) increases by 1 unit, the
next recession is expected to occur in about 8 quarters. When the inflation rate increases
by 1 unit, the next recession is expected to occur 3.4 quarters further out in the future.
Among all those statistically significant variables, the leading indicator index (Leading)
has the highest absolute value of coefficient while the GDP growth has the lowest
absolute value of coefficient.
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Table 10
Partial effect at the average (PEA)
Variables Mean
dy/dx
Spread
.0765443
0.192
Leading
.6759613
8.008***
GDPG
3.017687
0.108
Infla
1.118649
-3.360***
M2G
1.643794
-3.060***
FFRCh
-.0310204
0.693
OilPCh
.0191629
-2.732
UnempCh .007483
-3.719**
IndProd
-.4123588
0.273
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Std.Err.
0.061
0.412
0.104
0.412
0.273
0.361
1.975
1.082
0.118

Z
3.130
19.420
1.030
-8.160
-11.200
1.920
-1.380
-3.440
2.300

P>z
0.002
0.000
0.301
0.000
0.000
0.055
0.167
0.001
0.021

However, the average partial effect of each independent variable (APE) is usually
preferred to the partial effect at the average (PEA). The following shows how to get the
common scale factor for the APE.
̂

̂

𝑥𝑖 𝛽
∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝑒 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 ]
∑185
𝜕𝑝(𝑥)
]
̂
𝑖=1 [𝑒
= 𝑒 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 𝛽̂𝑗 =
𝛽̂𝑗 =
𝛽̂𝑗 = 12.660𝛽̂𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝑛
185

Meanwhile, Table 11 compares coefficients from the Poisson regression and the marginal
effects in both APE and PEA methods. The overall result shows that APE produces
higher marginal effect values than does PEA.

Table 11
Poisson coefficients, APE, PEA
̂𝐣
APE
𝛃
Spread
0.020
0.250
Leading
0.822
10.409
GDPG
0.011
0.140
Infla
-0.345
-4.367
M2G
-0.314
-3.978
FFRCh
0.071
0.901
OilPCh
-0.280
-3.551
UnempCh
-0.382
-4.834
IndProd
0.028
0.354
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PEA
0.192
8.008
0.108
-3.360
-3.060
0.693
-2.732
-3.719
0.273
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To summarize, our first model (the Probit) is unable to discriminate between
recession or a lack of it for most of the time periods since neither the coefficients
estimated, nor the overall fit of the model turned out to be significant. On the other hand,
the Poisson model tracked the path of the economy toward actual recessions better. The
next chapter attempts forecasting based on these models even though greater reliance can
be placed on the Poisson.
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FORECASTING
Probit Forecasting
Figure 8 (Appendices) shows in-sample forecasting by the Probit model based on
the actual values of the independent variables and the estimated coefficients. When the
predicted probability of a recession is over 50% (0.5), we take the model to have
predicted a recession in that period. In addition, if the model-predicted start of a
recession is close to the period, albeit not exactly the same period, in which an actual
recession started, we can say the model has predicted well. Based on the results, the
Probit model predicts that there was a 90% chance of a recession in the first quarter of
2008 while the Great Recession in 2008 occurred between December 2007 and June 2009
(18 months). With a 93% probability, it predicted a recession would have begun in the
first quarter of 2001 while the dot-com recession was observed between April 2001 and
November 2001 (8 months). The Probit model predicted a 73% probability of a recession
in the third quarter of 1990 while the recession occurred between August 1990 and March
1991 (8 months). The model also predicted 98% probability of a recession in the third
quarter of 1981 while the real recession began in August 1981 and ended in November
1982 (16 months). The model assigned a 55% probability for a recession in the first
quarter of 1980 and 56% in the second quarter of 1979 while the real recession happened
between February 1980 and July 1980 (6 months). Finally, for the real recession that
occurred between December 1973 and March 1975 (16 months), the Probit gave a 75%
chance for the last quarter of 1973.
It is remarkable that the Probit model’s overall prediction of recessions comes out
so well within sample despite the fact that few of our variables acquired statistical
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significance. However, this model is not able to forecast out of sample, that is, when the
next recession will occur, without a clear set of data for independent variables for the
future. In order to estimate a reasonably decent model, it was necessary to save all the
observations for estimation. We could create scenarios in terms of projections for the
independent variables in order to make forecasts of a recession within the next four or
eight quarters. This would probably have been an unrealistic adventure when the fit of
the model was not good enough. Hence, we move to the next model.
Poisson Forecasting
Figure 9 (Appendices) shows the trends of predicted and actual numbers of
quarters till a next recession from the Poisson Regression. Figure 9 shows that the
Poisson model predicted well the trend from the beginning of the period to the third
quarter of 1991. The closer the quarters are to zero, the economy is nearer to a recession.
However, the model seems to predict recessions a few quarters after the actual data.
Meanwhile, there is a certain pattern in Figure 9 that when the predicted numbers of
quarters are less than five, it seems that a recession is coming close. When the predicted
quarters go lower than ten, it could be a red flag that a recession is coming. However,
after the 2008 financial crisis, there was one time that the predicted quarter went below 5,
and a few times that the predicted quarter went below 10, a recession hasn’t happened yet
since the financial crisis in 2008. This could be a sign that the next recession could
happen anytime soon, even though the way the predicted quarters shown in Figure 9
makes it very challenging to predict when the next recession will occur.
Table 12 shows a better detail of when the next recession might occur from the
most recent results. The Poisson model forecasts that the next recession will be likely
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some time between the last quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2021. The last quarter
of 2020 seems to show up the most for the next recession in Table 12. However, the
forecasts of a recession in the first quarter or up to fourth quarter from the last period in
the sample does not seem accurate. We can rely on the prediction over the next five
quarters or even a longer time frame.
Table 12
Predicting number of quarters till the next recession
Date
Predicted # quarters Predicted the next recession
st
1 quarter of 2017
11.531
~ 3rd quarter of 2019
nd
2 quarter of 2017
13.932
~ 3rd quarter of 2020
3rd quarter of 2017
16.189
~ 2nd quarter of 2020
th
4 quarter of 2017
14.360
~ 1st quarter of 2021
1st quarter of 2018
14.663
~ 4th quarter of 2020
nd
2 quarter of 2018
13.066
~ 4th quarter of 2020
rd
3 quarter of 2018
12.057
~ 4th quarter of 2020
4th quarter of 2018
14.090
~ 1st quarter of 2022
The predicted numbers of quarters throughout Table 12 would have made more
sense if the predicted number of quarters decreases at the later quarters. For example, the
model predicted about 12 more quarters till the next recession since the third quarter of
2018 while the model predicted about 14 more quarters till the next recession since the
last quarter of 2018. According to the data, the main causes that pushes the next
recession further away were the yield spread that increases from -5.14% in the third
quarter of 2018 to 0.37% in the last quarter of 2018 and the effective Federal Funds rate
that increases from 1.92% in the third quarter of 2018 to 2.22% in the last quarter of
2018.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze models that might realistically
indicate when the next recession might occur after the Great Recession of December
2007 ‒ June 2009. This paper sets up two models (Probit and Poisson) to forecast the
next recession. However, forecasting a recession has been a challenge for decades as it
can never produce an accurate result. Therefore, a close forecasting result should be

considered a good result. Since forecasting is hazardous and good policies to forestall a
recession are, therefore, hard to implement on time, it is impossible to avoid a recession.
But once a recession has been observed, it is important to offset or at least reduce its
negative impact. The results from this paper not only estimate when the next recession
will be but also suggest what can be done to reduce the probability of a recession.
The results from the Probit model, to the extent we can discuss them, show that
what may trigger and sustain a recession is Leading (leading indicators), Infla (inflation
rate), FFRCh (effective federal funds rate), and UnempCh (unemployment rate). The
model suggests increasing the leading indicators, decreasing inflation rate, and decreasing
unemployment rate in order to enhance the economy’s performance. This means that the
government should undertake policies that favor the 10 elements of CLI including hours
worked in manufacturing, building permits, interest rate spread, and manufacturing
orders for both capital and consumer goods. The positive coefficient for the effective
federal funds rate that the model indicates suffers from endogeneity of the rate itself. For
the unemployment rate, the government should have more favorable policies and less
restrictions toward small businesses as well as entrepreneurs, especially in the
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manufacturing industry since the manufacturing industry is one of the elements that enter
the leading indicator index.
According to the results, a near future recession is likely to occur when the
predicted probability of a recession is greater than 0.5 or 50%, from the Probit model, and
when the predicted period is under five quarters from the Poisson model. The Probit
model cannot forecast when the next recession will be if we do not have access to
projected data for all the independent variables. Most results from the Poisson model,
however, agree that the next recession will happen by the last quarter of 2020. This
forecast seems to agree with many other economists. Sherman (2019) argues that a
majority of economists think the next recession will come by the 2020 election which
would be in November 2020. Moreover, a Zillow survey suggests the next recession in
the U.S.A is likely to arrive in 2020 (Hinchliffe, 2018) even though many others claim
the next recession will hit in 2019.
It has been over 10 years since the last recession. Historically, just this piece of
data will suggest that we can expect a recession in the near term. Therefore, I believe the
authorities should stay alert and be prepared to take appropriate policies to soften any
blow from the next recession. A better model, which might be a better fit to answer how
much longer an economy can survive till a recession, is the survival analysis. This model
has been used a lot in many medical fields to test a new treatment. However, what is
challenging in this model is that there is only one individual (the economy) over multiple
periods of time (time series data) while the survival analysis is more about a group of
multiple individuals over time (panel data). Once one can figure out how to define the
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data correctly, the application of the survival analysis could be useful in forecasting when
the next recession would be.
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APPENDICES

Figure 1: Ratio of U.S. households net worth to GDP quarterly by index scale value 100 of 1951 (1951 – 2019)
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Figure 2: Stock Market Capitalization to GDP for U.S. with Buffet Indicators (1975 – 2017)
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Figure 3: Monetary base vs. Currency in circulation (1941 – 2018)
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Figure 4: Unemployment rate (1948 – 2018)
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Figure 5: Yield Curve by quarter (1953 – 2018)
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Figure 6: Effective Federal Funds Rate by quarter (1950 – 2018)
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Figure 7: Actual number of Quarters (diffdays) till the next recession quarterly (1950 – 2018)
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Figure 8: Actual vs. predicted Recession from Probit Regression quarterly
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Figure 9: Predicted vs. actual numbers of quarters till the next recession by Poisson Model
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